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HISTORICAL STATUS OF TIBET * 
-NIRMAI. C. SINHA· 
In the Seventh and Eighth Centuries A. D. Tibet 
emerges as a mighty military power often carrying raids 
and expeditiuns into India and China. In 763 the Tibetans 
captured Sian (Chaug-an), the then capital of China and 
for nearly seventy years (781-848) they ruled the Tun-huang 
region. Tibet's eminence as a great power was attained 
under the line of her Religious Kings (Song-tsen~ Gam-po 
to Ral-pa-chen, circa 620-8:20) who enacted a veritable 
renascence in the life and thought of the country by inven-
tion of an alphabet (based on Indic Brahmi script), intro· 
duction of Buddhism (Mahayana) and systematic patr nage 
of literature and fine arts. Tibet hecame an active agency 
of a new civilization all over the highlands of Asia. In 
the process, however, her military spirit and ancient 
skill in war far from making any proportionate progress 
declined. Besides in the reaction against th(" ap(lstacy of 
king Lang Darma (d. 842) the monarchy became discredited, 
the central power collapsed and the .country was parcelled 
into numerous lay and monastic principalities. 
Thus when (1200) the lvIongols launchFd their world 
conquests from the Altai Karakoram, '] ibe\ - though intellec-
tually and culturally quite ripe to be the teacher and the 
priest of the Mongols-was quite unfit to ward off the 
MOI)gol menace. The Tibetan chiefs bought peace with 
Jenghiz Khan by despatch of a joint delegation with an 
offer of submission (1207). Within thirty years Tibet cap-
tured her captor; the abbots of Sakya sect converted die 
Mongol imperial family to Buddhhm and the Sakya L~Ipa 
became the priest of the Mongol Emperor (J 230·1244 , 
sometime later the Sakya Lama wall recognized by Kublai 
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Khan as the ruler of Central Tibet. The Mongols were then 
engaged in a permanent conquest of Northern China. In 
1278 the Chinese Sung Dynasty was finally overthrown and 
Kublai Khan became the Emperor of China. The relation 
between the Mongol Emperor and the Sakya Lama, which 
was anterior to the Mongol conquest of China and the 
transfer of Mongol metropolis to Peking, continued as before. 
The Mongol dynasty in China was supplanted by a Chinese 
(Ming) dynasty in 1368. 
The Mongol chiefs in Mongolia and Chinese borderlands 
however continued active contact with Tibetan Lamas. A 
new sect called Gelugpa (Yellow), founded by Tsong-khapa 
who came from Koko Nor region (a region just adjacent 
to Mongolia), gained the devotion of these Mongol chiefs; 
the Sakya Lamas meanwhile declined both in power and 
prestige. The third Gelugpa hierarch visited (1578) Mongolia 
and converted the leading chief Altan Khan, the well-known 
scourge of Chinese (Ming) emperors. Altan Khan called 
the Gelugpa hierarch Dalai Lama and recognized the DaJai 
Lama as the ruler of Central Tibet. In 1644 a foreign 
(Manchu) dynasty overthrew the Mings. The Manchus imme-
diately sought to participate in Tibetan politics. The Mongol 
Khan (Gusri) acted swiftly and confirmed the Dalai Lama 
(the Fifth) as an independent ruler (1645). 
The Manchus had evinced interest in Tibet even before 
they had settled in Peking. Gusri Khan incident taught 
them that the central power in Tibet was the Dalai Lama. 
Besides, the Manchu felt, the institution of Dalai Lama 
had a special usefulness. The Mongols in MongoHa and 
e1~ewhere hdd the Dalai Lama in high respect. Manchu 
(and not Chinese) imperial interest thus necessitated a close 
relation with the Dalai Lama. In 1652 the Dalai Lama 
was persuaded to call upon the Manchu Emperor in Peking. 
Whilf' the wise Manchu received the Dalai Lama as the 
King of Tibet, the court annalists recorded, in typical Chinese 
manner, that the Lama came to pay homage. The Manchu 
(then nationalized as Ching) Emperor became paramount 
authority for Tibet only in the 1720s when succession disputes 
regarding the office of the Dalai Lama and dissensions 
bt"tweeg. Tibetans and Mongols induced and ca])ed for foreign 
intervention. For a little over one hundred years the Manchu 
or Ching paramountcy was a fact though Tibet never became 
a part of Chinese territory. In 1855, when the Gurkhas 
invaded Tibet, the paramountcy had liquidated itself by 
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corruption and inefficiency, and Tibet had to fend for itself. 
Powers other than the Manchu Emperor were then looming 
large on the horizon of Tibet; Britain and Russia had by 
that time become neighbours of Tibet. The ghost of Manchu 
paramountcy was laid in 1911 with the Expulsion of the 
Manchus. 
II 
The relationship between the Manchu Emperor and the 
Dalai Lama was a patron-priest relationship following the 
precedent of Altan Khan and the Gelugpa hierarch or Kublai 
Khan and the Sakya hierarch. It involved two personali-
ties possessing the same faith, one its exponent and priest 
and the other its lay devotee and protector. It did not 
involve any confederation, to use a modern term, between 
the two countries. The relationship had produced a firm 
political superiority, call it hegemony or paramountcy, for 
the patron, that is, the Manchu Emperor, only for about a 
century and a quarter from 1 no. This paramountcy was 
dead from the middle of the Nineteenth Century. When in 
1911 the Manchu Empire fell, the Manchu dynasty was 
expelled from Peking and a republican regime was set up, 
the theoretical paramountcy of the Manchu Emperor over 
the Dalai Lama was automatically liquidated. That the 
republican regime in China could keep alive the doctrine of 
paramountcy was not a little due to the British diplomacy in 
Asia. It is therefore necessary to describe this phenomenon. 
British Government in India and their controlling autho-
rities in London had a dread of Russian expansion all over 
the highlands of Asia not excluding Tibet; this dread had 
its justification in British point of view. In contacting the 
the Dalai Lama or Tibetan authorities, Russia had a decided 
advantage over Britain. Among her motley population, Russia 
counted a good number of Buddhists (Buriats and Kalmuks) 
who made frequent trips, for pilgrimage as well as trade. to 
Lhasa as to Urga (Ulan Bator). In the second half of the 
Nineteenth Century the Mongols were gravitating from the 
Manchus to the Romanovs. Would the Bodpas (Tibetans) 
follow the same line ? 
A primary reason for British contact with Tibet was to 
open China and to trade with China from the west by over-
land. Britain's anxiety was to trade with China, and not 
with Tibet so much, so as to turn the adverse balance of 
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eastern trade. When Britain did eventually open China and 
gained substantial advantages by the Treaty of Nanking (1842) 
Tibet took a second place in the Far Eastern diplomacy of 
Britain. The British diplomats in China got the Chinese point 
of view about China's interests and affairs in Central Asia. 
Verbiage and bombast of Chinese annals and archives were 
. not altogether unknown to the British in (:hina; they had dis-
covered in the list of tributaries of the Mancim dynasty the 
following entries - Britain, Holland, Portug.al and Russia besides 
the Pope. Nevertheless, the British in their own interests 
accepted the Chinese doctrine of Tibet as a vassal state, 
In 1876 Britain made a treaty "",ith China for exploration 
across Tibet, from India to China or from China to India. 
When some years later Britain proposed to despatch a mission 
Tibet flatly refused. Since China could not help in the matter 
Britain sent thle proposed mission equipped with a military 
escort. It led to an armed conflict with Tibet inside the terri-
tories of Sikkim. It was now a matter of 'face' for China. 
The upshot was the curious treaty of 1890 regarding Sikkim. 
It not only assumed that China was paramount power over 
Tibet but also that directly or through Tibet, China could 
decide the Sikkim-Tibet borders. Britain gave away Chumbi 
valley which was an integral part of Sikkim and the nucleus 
of the kingdom of Sikkim. . 
Britain was all out to recognize China as the para-
mount authority for Tibet and Tibetan affairs. Tibet left 
alone might be victim of Russian expansioni~m. Therefore 
the shadow of Chinese paramountcy, called suzerainty by Britain, 
was made to lengthen over the land of Lamas. But such 
fiction alone could not guarantee the security which Britain 
looked for. China again failed to enable Britain to establish 
trading ri~hts in Tibet as in the mainland of China. 011 
the other hand, Russian agents could visit Tibet rather often. 
So in 1903-4, an armed mission was despatched to Lhasa. 
Tibetan.:; put up resistance, admittedly ill-equipped and unor-
ganized. The British Missiun reached Lhasa on August 3, 
1904 and dictated a treatv on September 7, 1904. China 
was not there to protect the vassal state and the provisions 
of the two Anglo-Chinese Conventions (1890 & 1893) had 
to be ratified by this treaty between Britain and Tibet. That 
was ample evidence that China had ceased to be paramount 
power with Tibet. 
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Yet a year and a half later (April 1906). Britain raised 
the suzerainty issue and made a treaty with China regarding 
Tibet in confirmation of Anglo-Tibetan Treaty (September 
1904). If however China was in reality the suzerain, the 
Anglo~Chinese Treaty (April 1906) should have been the last 
word 2lbout Tibet. But in 1907 (August 31) Britain and 
Russia concluded· a treaty regarding each other's intentions 
and interests not only about. Persia and Afganistan but also 
Tibet. The real issue was not Chinese suzerainty but Anglo-
Russian conflict. 
Even after the Anglo-Russian Entente, Britain remained 
anxious about Russian intentions and continued to oppose 
Tibet vis-a-vis China. When, during his exile in India (1910-12) 
the 13th Dalai Lama solicited British support for Tibetan 
independence, British authorities told him that His Majesty 
the King Emperor "regrets that he is unable to interfere 
between Dalai Lama and his suzerainJ}. 
The Chinese Revolution, called Expulsion of the Manchu, 
broke out in 1911. The remnants (i)f Manchu troops in Tibet 
were repatriated to Chipa under the auspices of British Govern-
ment in India (1912) .. The Dalai Lama returned from India 
and entered Lhasa in Jauuary 1913. The Patron-Priest rela-
tionship was now lost for ever. The Dalai Lama made a 
formal declaration of independence. 
Shortly afterwards, news of a treaty concluded in January 
1913 between Tibet and Mongolia (which had bec()me fully 
independent of Manchu Empire in 1911) reached the outside 
world. Britain sought to reject the report as unfounded and 
later the treaty as invalid, since Tibet was "not independent" 
and thus not capable of making treaties. The real reason 
for British opposition was the attainment of Mongolian 
independence under Russian support and its likely repercussions 
on Tibet. 
Yet in keeping with facts of the matter, Britain sat in 
a tripartite conference (Simla 1913-14) with China and Tibet 
"to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning 
the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia".. 
When at the end of the deliberations, Chinese delegate refused 
to sign the entire agreement because of the. inacceptability 
of the clauses regarding the Sino-Tibetan frontier, Britain and 
Tibet signed the Convention and jointly declared China debar-
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red from the pirvileges accruing from the Convention. Among 
such benefits was the recognition of China's suzerainty over 
Tibet. 
Such was the position till the rise of Japanese expamionism 
in the 1930s When both Britain and the United States were 
engaged in aiding and propping up China. It thus became 
a fair proposition, in Anglo-American view, to ignore the 
independence of Tibet and to strenghten the status of China 
on all fron ts. 
During the War (1939-45) China was admitted into the 
counsels of the leading Allies. In the Pacific Council in 
Washington (1943) the British Prime Minister (Winston Chur-
chill) assured China that e'no one contests Chinese suzerainty". 
The British Foreign Minister (Anthony Eden) followed this 
in an explanatory memorandum that China's suzerainty over 
Tibet was not unconditional or absolute. 
The Tripartite Convention (Simla 1914) recogniz~d 
China's suzerainty over Tibet but had determined Its 
limitations in no uncertain terms. Thus the autonomy of 
Outer Tibet (that is, Tibet under Dalai Lama's rule) was 
recognized, its territorial integrity confirmed and non-inter-
ference in its administration guaranteed. China engaged 
not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and not to se nd 
troops to Tibet. Tibet had never accepted the British theo ry 
of Chinese suzerainty and when China failed to ratify th e 
Tripartite Convention, Britain and, Tibet by a joint declaration 
debarred China from the benefits of the Convention. It is 
therefore not a little curious that nearly 30 years after this 
Britain spoke of (nominal) Chinese suzerainty. 
III 
The term suzerainty does not feature as a firm and 
precise category in the minds of jurists and is not capable 
of an absolute definition. In practice as well as in theory 
its content has varied in the relations between different 
European powers who all inherited concepts and usages of 
Roman jurisprudence. In the context of Asia the very 
application of the term suzerainty was liable to be inapprow 
priate and confusing. The partron-priest relationship between 
the Manchu Emperor and the Dalai Lama was not a matter 
to be identified with any concept of Roman or European 
jurisprudence. 
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The Manchu Emperor, or his government at Peking, 
exercised suzerainty in Tibet in modern Western sense, 
that is, beyond the field of patron~prie5t relationship, only once. 
This was in 1909~ 1 0 when after some years of preparation the 
Chinese launched an invasion of Tibet. This was, the Chinese 
said, to reform the administration. The reformist activitirs of 
the army of occupation were however characterized by so much 
excess that Chao Erh-feJlg, the commander of the expedition, 
earned the sobriquet Butcher. Before the expedition reached 
Lhasa the Dalai Lama left for India and sought asylum with the 
British Government. While the Dalai Lama declared that 
the patron-priest relationship had ended with the invasion, 
the Chinese deposed him. The Tibetans put up a total 
non-cooperation with the Chinese and even the Panchen Lama 
refused to head a temporary administration. The Chinese 
found that it was a grave blunder to depose the Dalai Lama. 
The revolution in China broke out shortly and the Dalai 
Lama returned. He now made a formal declaration that 
he was ruler of Tibet under the orders of the Buddha. 
The Dalai Lama XIII ruled for the rest of his life (l913~33) 
as an independent ruler and gave no quarters to any theory 
of suzerainty~British or Cbinese. 
The Tibetan contention that China had no suzerainty 
over Tibet finds support from certain undisputed fact!!. 
Tibet was not bound by any treatie-sor agreements which 
China made with any third power. Tibet thus flatly refused 
to abide by the Anglo-Chinese agreements (1876, 1890 & 1893) 
and the rights which Britain obtained under these agreements 
had to be validated by the Lhasa Convention (1904). 
Chinese visas did not enable foreigners entry into Tibet. 
This was as true of the last decades of the Nineteen th Cen tury, 
when Rockhill, Bonvalot and others had to resort to other 
means, as of the Second World War when U. S. officials found 
their Chinese visas useless. In 1939 Tibet refused admission to a 
Chinese diplomat (Wu Chung Hsin) even. On the other 
hand Tibetan passports had validity abroad. 
China's participation in the War did not involve Tibet; 
Tibet remained neutr<.11 and in spite of strong pressure from 
Britain and U.S.A. refused passage for arms supply to China. 
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For all this we have to go back to 1913 when Republican 
China agreed to sit at Simla Conference with Tibet as a 
treaty-making power; Tibet's sovereignty was thereby admitted. 
Inferences have been drawn from the institution of 
tributes to the Manchu court. Whatever were the implications 
of such practice, no tributes were despatched after the 
Manchus went out. 
There were no Ambans (Chinese Residents) during the 
sovereign regime of the Dalai Lama XIII (1913-33). On his 
death a delegation came from Peking to mourn and managed 
to dig in under one plea or other. The successive Chinese 
Commissioners could not however make Tibet an integral 
part of China as was clearly borne out by Tibet's neutrality 
during the War. In 1949 the Chinese Mission was expelled. 
Tibet as an independent country had its own currency 
and customs, its own postal service and telegraph and its 
own civil service and its own army. 
In 1950 China, that is, the People's Republic of China, 
invaded Tibet and placed it under regular military occupa-
tion. By the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 1951 (May 23) Tibet 
was made to surrender its independence to China. Tibet 
became Tibet Region of China. 
The requirement of a treaty bore eloquent testimony 
to the historical status of Tibet. The claims of "liberation" 
were intrinsically insufficient to regularize what was an annexa·· 
tion. Remedy lay in the formality of an ~'agreement" between 
the so-called great motherland (China) and the so-called 
national minority (Tibet). 
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